Back to blogSurgery Centers and Medical Devices on the Network
    By Jeff Dennis, Founder & CEONovember 18, 2026

    Surgery Centers and Medical Devices on the Network

    Healthcare#hipaa#healthcare#surgery-centers#network-segmentation

    Ambulatory surgery centers run on equipment that most IT teams do not control. Anesthesia workstations, patient monitors, imaging systems, sterilization tracking, endoscopy towers, and infusion pumps often arrive configured by the manufacturer, run operating systems the center cannot update, and come with service agreements that include remote support. They also sit on the center's network, next to the EHR, email, and scheduling systems.

    That combination creates a specific kind of risk. The device may be outside your control, but the network it sits on is not, and the HIPAA obligations for the electronic protected health information it touches are yours. This post covers how to approach medical device security in a surgery center when you do not own the device's software.

    What HIPAA expects

    The HIPAA Security Rule does not have a separate section for medical devices. It does not need one. Under 45 CFR 164.308(a)(1), the security management process requires an accurate and thorough risk analysis of the potential risks and vulnerabilities to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of ePHI held by the covered entity, along with risk management measures that reduce those risks to a reasonable and appropriate level.

    If a device stores, displays, or transmits ePHI, it belongs in that risk analysis. If a device does not hold ePHI but shares a network with systems that do, it still affects the risk to those systems. Either way, it needs to be considered. Our post on HIPAA risk analysis for a small practice walks through what an accurate and thorough analysis looks like.

    HHS's 405(d) program publication, Health Industry Cybersecurity Practices, commonly called HICP, includes medical device security as one of its recommended practices and offers guidance for small, medium, and large organizations. It is a useful reference for surgery centers because it was written with healthcare operations in mind.

    The NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 covers the same territory under PR.IR, technology infrastructure resilience, which includes protecting networks and environments from unauthorized logical access and usage.

    Start with an inventory

    You cannot protect what you have not listed. For each device connected to the network, record:

    • Device type, manufacturer, and model
    • Where it is located and which department relies on it
    • Operating system and version, if known
    • Whether it stores, displays, or transmits ePHI
    • Network connection details, including IP address and which network segment it is on
    • Who supports it, and how the vendor connects for support
    • Whether the manufacturer provides security updates, and how they are delivered

    Ask each manufacturer for its Manufacturer Disclosure Statement for Medical Device Security, known as the MDS2 form. It is a standard questionnaire many manufacturers complete that describes the device's security features, such as whether it encrypts data, supports unique logins, logs activity, and accepts updates. It will not answer every question, but it gives you a starting point and a document for your risk analysis.

    Biomedical engineering, whether in house or contracted, usually has a list of equipment. IT usually has a list of network connections. The two lists rarely match. Reconciling them is often the most useful first step.

    Segment the network

    Segmentation is the most effective control a surgery center can apply to devices it cannot patch. The idea is simple: put devices into separate network zones based on what they need to talk to, and block everything else.

    A typical approach:

    • Clinical devices in their own segments, grouped by function or vendor, able to reach only the specific servers or gateways they need.
    • Business systems such as workstations, email, and scheduling in another segment.
    • Guest and patient Wi Fi completely separate, with internet access only.
    • Building systems such as HVAC, access control, and cameras in their own segment.
    • Vendor remote access terminating in a controlled place rather than directly on devices.

    The rules between segments should allow only the connections that are needed, and those needs should be documented. If ransomware lands on a front desk workstation, segmentation is what keeps it from reaching the anesthesia workstation in the OR.

    Segmentation needs to be planned with clinical staff and device vendors. Some devices need specific connections to function, and breaking those connections during a case is not acceptable. Test changes during scheduled downtime and confirm with the vendor what each device requires.

    Control vendor remote access

    Device manufacturers frequently need remote access to support their equipment. That access is often provided through always on connections, shared credentials, or tools installed on the device itself. Each of those is a path into your network.

    Good practice includes:

    • A single, controlled method for vendor remote access, rather than many vendor specific tools.
    • Access enabled on request and disabled when the session ends.
    • Named accounts for vendor technicians, with MFA.
    • Logging of every session, including who connected, when, and to which device.
    • A business associate agreement with any vendor whose access involves ePHI.

    Review vendor access as part of your vendor management program. When a service contract ends, make sure the access ends too.

    Plan for the device that cannot be fixed

    Some devices run outdated operating systems with known vulnerabilities, and the manufacturer either cannot update them or has not validated an update. Replacing them may not be an option until the next capital cycle.

    For those devices:

    • Document the risk in your risk analysis.
    • Isolate the device as tightly as possible.
    • Disable services and ports the device does not need, with vendor agreement.
    • Monitor traffic to and from the device for anything unusual.
    • Add replacement to the capital plan, with the security reason recorded.
    • Know how the center will keep running if the device or its network goes down. Our post on EHR downtime procedures covers the contingency planning side.

    The goal is not perfection. It is a documented, reasonable decision that reduces risk as far as practical.

    Bring purchasing into it

    The easiest time to address device security is before the device is bought. Add a few questions to the purchasing process:

    • Will the manufacturer provide the MDS2 form?
    • How are security updates delivered, and for how long?
    • What network access does the device need?
    • How does the vendor provide remote support?
    • Does the device support unique user logins and logging?

    These questions do not need to block purchases. They make sure IT and compliance know what is coming and can plan for it.

    Where to begin

    For most surgery centers, the first steps are reconciling the device inventory, mapping which devices touch ePHI, and reviewing how vendors connect remotely. Those three tasks usually reveal the most important segmentation work.

    Our healthcare page explains how we support surgery centers and other clinical practices, and our HIPAA framework page covers the Security Rule's requirements in more detail. We sign BAAs with our healthcare clients and work alongside biomedical vendors rather than around them. If you want help mapping your device environment, book your free risk review.

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